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Coercion in California: Eugenics Reconstituted in 
Welfare Reform, the Contracting of Reproductive 
Capacity, and Terms of Probation 
Janet Simmonds∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In an era where courts are reaffirming landmark right to privacy 
decisions,1 such as Griswold v. Connecticut,2 Eisenstadt v. Baird,3 and Roe 
v. Wade,4 and expanding the scope of a constitutionally protected right to 
privacy, it is seemingly unthinkable to imagine that the exercise of such 
rights is being legally perverted to promote eugenic ideals.  However, this 
is precisely what has been happening.  In particular, this Note addresses 
how the state of California and private actors within the state are using 
legally sanctioned means to coerce women into making decisions regarding 
their reproductive capacities that are in effect, and perhaps in purpose, 
eugenic in nature. 
Today, the application of eugenics5 is thought of as a bygone horror. 
 
∗  J.D. Candidate, May 2006, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; 
M.A., Anthropology, San Francisco State University, May 2002; B.A. Anthropology, Rice 
University, January 2000.  I would like to thank Professor D. Kelly Weisberg and the 
members of the Hastings Women’s Law Journal, especially associate editor Sarah Orman 
and members Sandra Kain and Kristen Ross, for their assistance in editing this note.             
I would also like to express my gratitude to my family, in particular my mother Barbara and 
my husband Denver, for their unconditional support. 
 1.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding the right to privacy 
protected by the Constitution includes the right to engage in intimate conduct undisturbed 
by the government). 
 2.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding a Connecticut restriction 
on contraceptive use a violation of the constitutional right to marital privacy). 
 3.   Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending the holding of Griswold; 
unmarried individuals also have a constitutional right to privacy that precludes a restriction 
on contraceptives). 
 4.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding the constitutional right to privacy 
includes the right to abortion). 
 5.  Eugenics is defined as “[t]he study of hereditary improvement of a breed or race, 
especially of human beings, by genetic control.”  THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 
(2nd ed. 1983). 
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Most notably, eugenical thought was the basis of a series of crimes against 
humanity utilized to further the racist ideologies of fearsome regimes like 
that of Hitler6 or Pol Pot.7  Yet, the United States has its own intimate 
history with the pseudo-science.8  A dark moment in our judicial history is 
forever recorded in the Supreme Court opinion of Buck v. Bell.9 In Buck, 
the Court upheld a Virginia law that provided for the sterilization of 
persons who were institutionalized for insanity or imbecility.10  It is from 
this case that we get Justice Wendell Holmes’ infamous quote, “It is better 
for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for 
crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those 
who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. . . . Three generations 
of imbeciles are enough.”11  The Court has since criticized the case, and 
even very recently had occasions to reference it, yet the Court never 
overturned the holding.12 
 
 6.  JAMES M. GLASS, “LIFE UNWORTHY OF LIFE”: RACIAL PHOBIA AND MASS MURDER 
IN HITLER’S GERMANY (Basic Books 1997).  In an effort to “[rebuild] a genetically fit race” 
after World War I, German officials used means of applied biology and negative eugenics to 
cleanse society of the diseased and criminal aspects of society: Jews and other undesirables.  
Id. at 31.  From 1934-1945, an estimated 1 percent of Germans were sterilized under a 1933 
sterilization law (aimed at Jews).  Id. at 39.  The German bureaucrats saw this as a way to 
save national funds and get rid of welfare for the biologically inferior.  Id.  The actual 
numbers of sterilizations performed by the Nazis is hard to pinpoint; the numbers vary from 
360,000 to 3,500,000 between 1933 and 1945 alone. Paul A. Lombardo, Medicine, 
Eugenics, and the Supreme Court: From Coercive Sterilization to Reproductive Freedom, 
13 J.  CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 12 (1996); Holocaust Museum Houston Holocaust 
Facts, http://www.hmh.org/ed_faqs.asp (last visited April 11, 2006).  In the end, the Nazis 
began the “Final Solution” to completely rid Europe of Jews.  Overall an estimated 
5,830,000 Jews were killed during the Nazi regime, plus other undesirables, such as 
Communists, trade unionists, Socialists, Roma and Sinti (Gypsies), Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
Soviet citizens, Soviet prisoners of war, and homosexuals. 
 7.  The Cambodian Genocide Program, http://www.yale.edu/cgp/ (last visited April 
11, 2006). The Khmer Rouge regime, led by Pol Pot, killed an estimated 1,700,000 
Cambodians (21 percent of the population) between 1975-1979.  The purpose of the 
genocide was to reconstruct Cambodia as a Communist Peasant society. Thus, large 
numbers of professionals, military personnel, and ethnic minorities were killed.  Those who 
were spared were relocated from the urban areas to the countryside, where they were starved 
and forced to work as laborers. Peace Pledge Union Information, Talking about Genocide- 
Genocides Cambodia 1975, http://www.ppu.org.uk/genocide/g_cambodia1.html (last visited 
April 11, 2006). 
 8.  Eugenics has largely been debunked, but lives on in works such as that of 
RICHARD HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS 
STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (The Free Press 1994). 
 9.  274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. at 207. 
 12.  Justice Souter in his concurrence in Tenn. v. Lane, cited the case in reference to 
the “situation of disabled individuals before the courts.”  541 U.S. 509, 534 (2004).  Buck 
was a footnote in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 
U.S. 356, 369 (2001): “The record does show that some states adopting the tenets of the 
eugenics movement of the early part of this century, required extreme measures such as 
sterilization of persons suffering from hereditary mental disease.  These laws were upheld 
against constitutional attack 70 years ago in Buck v. Bell.  But there is no indication that any 
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In 2003, California Governor Gray Davis issued a formal apology to 
the victims (and their families) who were sterilized under California’s 
eugenics laws.13  Davis said, “The people of California are deeply sorry for 
the suffering you endured over the years.  Our hearts are heavy for the pain 
caused by eugenics.  It was a sad and regrettable chapter in the state’s 
history, and it is one that must never be repeated again.”14  The strong 
implication in Davis’s statement is that eugenic measures that deny citizens 
their reproductive rights are a thing of the past.  Yet, today in California, 
there exist several forms of coercive measures that result in the loss of 
reproductive rights. 
In this Note, I will first traverse the history of the eugenics movement 
in California.  Next, I will look at the California welfare system’s use of a 
family cap (or child exclusion) program to limit the number of offspring 
born to poor women.  Then I will discuss Project Prevention, a California-
based organization that coerces poor, drug-addicted women into 
relinquishing their fertility for a drug fix.  Next, I will briefly address the 
creative sentencing used in the probation terms of semi-permanent 
contraception proposed in two California cases.  Finally, I will ground 
these discussions in the right to bodily integrity that is held within the 
constitutional right to privacy.  Throughout this Note I will also focus on 
the trope of deserving poor versus undeserving poor that underlies our laws 
and attitudes. 
II.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF EUGENICS IN CALIFORNIA 
A.  EUGENICS 
The ideology of eugenics is at odds with the American ideals of 
freedom and bodily integrity.  Even now, however, in a time when personal 
autonomy has been cemented by American jurisprudence, eugenical means 
of population control continue and thrive.  These methods, which interfere 
with reproductive privacy, are not mere remnants from a bygone era when 
America played a leading role in the eugenics movement worldwide; these 
methods are recreated every day. 
1.  A General Look 
Rooted in hard science, eugenics promised to solve some of the biggest 
social problems plaguing the modern world.  Eugenics comes from the 
Greek; it means “to be well born.”15  The eugenics movement developed 
 
state had persisted in requiring such harsh measures as of 1990 when the ADA was 
adopted.” (Citation omitted.) 
 13.  California Apologizes for Sterilization Law, Associated Press, Mar. 12, 2003, 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/West/03/12/davis.sterilization.ap (last visited April 11, 2006). 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  California’s Compulsory Sterilization Policies, 1909-1979: Informational 
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from the early genetic work of Gregor Mendel.16  Biological in theory, 
“[t]he goal of the eugenics movement was to improve the human race by 
preventing the genetically unfit from passing on their undesirable traits to 
their offspring.”17  Francis Galton, a European geneticist and the father of 
eugenics, defined it as “the study of the agencies under social control that 
may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations either 
physically or mentally.”18  Eugenics became a global phenomenon.19  In 
America, during the Progressive era,20 many people were concerned with 
“modern” problems like crime, poverty and overcrowding in the urban 
areas. Eugenics seemed to provide a solution.21  At the turn of the twentieth 
century in America, there were already several mechanisms for controlling 
“the face of the body politic”: 1) immigration;22 2) institutionalization; 3) 
regulation of entry into marriage;23 and, in the extreme, 4) sterilization of 
the unfit.24  The remainder of this discussion will focus on the sterilization 
of the unfit, and, in particular, California’s past and present role in 
eugenics. 
 
Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Genetics, Genetic Technologies and Public Policy, 
2003 Leg. 1242-S at 3 (Cal. 2003) (presentation by Dr. Alexandra Minna Stern, “The 
Darker Side of the Golden State: Eugenics Sterilization in California,” July 16, 2003). 
 16.  Michael G. Silver, Note, Eugenics and Compulsory Sterilization Laws: 
Providing Redress for the Victims of a Shameful Era in United States History, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 862, 864-65 (2004).  An argument can be made that eugenics predates 
Mendel.  For example, Spartans committed infanticide against any infant showing birth 
defects.  Archaeological excavations have also found proof of “baby disposal” areas inside 
Roman bordellos that were the resting place of “undesired” babies born to prostitutes.  Oana 
Iftime, A Few Considerations on Ancient and Modern Eugenics, 13 EUBIOS J. OF ASIAN AND 
INT’L BIOETHICS 221 (2003), http://www2.unescobkk.org/eubios/EJ136/ej136j.htm. 
 17.  California’s Compulsory Sterilization Policies, 1909-1979: Hearing Before the 
S. Select Comm. on Genetics, Genetic Technologies and Public Policy, 2003 Leg. iv (Cal. 
2003).  “[U]ndesirable traits often included ‘feeblemindedness,’ epilepsy, alcoholism, 
‘moral or sexual degeneracy,’ drug addiction, and pauperism.” 
 18.  Silver, supra note 16, at 865. 
 19.  Stern, supra note 15, at 3. 
 20.  Silver, supra note 16, at 865: “Eugenics ‘fit perfectly with Progressive ideology’ 
because eugenicists ‘were scientifically trained experts who sought to apply rational 
principles to solving problems of anti-social and problematic behavior by seeking out the 
cause, in this case poor heredity.’” 
 21.  California’s Compulsory Sterilization Policies, supra note 17, at iv. 
 22.  “The eugenicist thought [Jewish and Italian] immigrants would threaten public 
morality, poison the ‘American’ gene pool, and were ‘liable to become. . . public 
charge[s]’.”  The national origins quota system was premised on eugenic thought and was 
enforced under the Federal Immigration Restriction Act of 1924 until it was replaced by the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965.  Lombardo, supra note 6, at 5-6 (quoting ALAN 
M. KRAUT, SILENT TRAVELERS: GERMS, GENES AND THE “IMMIGRANT MENACE” (Basic 
Books 1994)). 
 23.  Eugenics theorists “characterized miscegenation (racial mixing) as a threat to the 
health of the white gene pool.”  An example of the laws that existed in many states was that 
of Virginia’s 1924 Racial Integrity Act, which was found to violate the constitutionally 
protected right to privacy in 1967’s Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1.  Lombardo, supra note 
6, at 19-20. 
 24.  Stern, supra note 15, at 4. 
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2.  Eugenics in California25 
In the Golden State, the eugenics movement had a uniquely Californian 
flavor.  “It was always linked to the use of land: to agriculture and plant 
hybridization.”26  It was breeding applied to humans. 
A powerful network of social workers, doctors, psychiatrists, biologists 
and philanthropists furthered the ideas of eugenics.27  They were mostly 
white Protestants who helped enact exclusionary laws to the detriment of 
California’s Indian, Mexican, and Asian populations.28  A primary goal of 
eugenics, besides developing a genetically better human race, was to save 
the state money.29  The idea was that the state could reduce, or eliminate, 
the amount of money that would otherwise go towards welfare and relief 
programs.30 
In 1909, California became the second state to pass a sterilization 
law.31  The statute, called the Asexualization Act, provided for the 
involuntary sterilization of certain categories of people, including inmates 
of state hospitals, certain institutionalized persons, prisoners convicted for 
life sentences, repeat offenders of certain sexual offenses, or just repeat 
offenders.32  The caveat was that sterilization had to be thought to benefit 
the individual physically, mentally or morally.33 The decision of whether to 
sterilize, however, was largely left in the hands of the hospital or 
institutions.34  The State Commission in Lunacy, founded in 1896 and in 
charge of regulating the mental institutions of California, promulgated rules 
to secure consent from the patient’s nearest relative before the sterilization 
occurred.35  However, some sterilizations were performed without consent, 
and in cases where consent was given, it is unknown how many of the 
relatives were coerced into giving it by doctors and other personnel.36 
 
 25.  See Jon Gottshall, The Cutting Edge: Sterilization and Eugenics in California, 
1909-1945, http://www.gottshall.com/thesis/article.htm (last visited April 11, 2006) for a 
concise, yet thorough discussion of California’s sterilization laws. 
 26.  Stern, supra note 15, at 4. 
 27.   Id. at 5. 
 28.  Id. at 4. 
 29.  Id. at 6. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. Indiana was the first state to pass such a law in 1907. Eventually over thirty 
states would enact such laws.  Mike Anton, Forced Sterilization Once Seen as Path to a 
Better World; Decades of Files on Mental Patients Reveal How a Group of Noted 
Californians Hoped to Influence the Fate of the Human Race, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 2003, at 
A1. 
 32.  California’s Compulsory Sterilization Policies, supra note 17, at v-vi. 
 33.  Id. at vi. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  California’s Compulsory Sterilization Policies, supra note 17.  In some cases, 
family members even requested sterilization be performed for the benefit of the patient. In 
particular, “mothers of young girls with unfortunate histories have requested that the work 
be done for protection’s sake.”  Anton, supra note 31: “Today, scholars believe consent for 
SIMMONDS - FOR CHRISTENSEN 4/12/2006  9:48 AM 
274 HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:2 
In 1913, the statute was repealed and replaced with another statute that 
made sterilization a condition of discharge.37  In 1917, the sterilization law 
was changed again, and further emphasized the genetic transmission of 
undesirable traits.38  Under California’s sterilization law, 83 percent of 
sterilizations in the United States had been performed in California by 
1921.39  In the 1920s, the Human Betterment Foundation (HBF) was 
founded in Pasadena, California.40  HBF,  a nonprofit corporation with high 
profile members and supporters, worked to promote eugenic sterilization 
through research and information for the public.41 
The eugenics movement in the United States culminated in the late 
1930s.42  The Supreme Court’s 1927 decision in Buck v. Bell upheld the 
constitutionality of a Virginia sterilization law, similar to California’s 
law.43  Carrie Buck, the woman whose fertility was at issue in Buck, was 
allegedly “feeble minded,” thus institutionalized and sterilized to prevent 
her from producing more undesirables.44  Yet, recent detective work has 
uncovered that Buck was of normal intelligence.  The real reason she was 
sent to an institution was to have a baby out of wedlock; and she              
was sterilized “as a matter of sexual morality and social deviance.”45       
 
many of California’s sterilizations were obtained through coercion.  It was something 
promoters knew at the time and kept hidden.” 
 37.  California’s Compulsory Sterilization Policies, supra note 17, at vii. SB 881 
(Butler), Chapter 363, Statutes of 1913: “Before any person who has been lawfully 
committed to any state hospital for the insane, or who has been an inmate of the Sonoma 
State Home, and who is afflicted with hereditary insanity or incurable chronic mania or 
dementia shall be released or discharged there from, the state commission in lunacy may in 
its discretion, after a careful investigation of all the circumstances of the case, cause such 
person to be asexualized, and such asexualization, whether with or without the consent of 
the patient, shall be lawful and shall not render the said commission, its members or any 
person participating in the operation liable either civilly or criminally.” 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  California’s Compulsory Sterilization Policies, supra note 17, at iv. 
 41.  Id. And the public, by and large, supported eugenics.  “Every president from 
Theodore Roosevelt to Herbert Hoover was a member of a eugenics organization, publicly 
endorsed eugenic laws, or signed eugenic legislation without voicing opposition.” 
Lombardo, supra note 6, at 1. 
 42.  Stern, supra note 15, at 7. 
 43.   274 U.S. 200; Buck was a “radical departure from existing Supreme Court 
medical jurisprudence.”  The case “was the first and only instance in which the Court 
allowed a physician, acting as the agent of state government, to perform an operation. . . 
neither desired or needed by the ‘patient.’”  Silver, supra note 16, at 867. 
 44.  274 U.S. at 205. 
 45.  The detective work of both Stephen Jay Gould and Paul A. Lombardo revealed 
that Carrie Buck was likely raped and impregnated and sent to an institution to hide that fact 
and the identity of her rapist.  In other words, it was a cover-up.  Also, Carrie herself was 
illegitimate, thus the sterilization was based more on the inheritance of social traits rather 
than biological ones. Lombardo, supra note 6, at 9-10; Stephen Jay Gould, Carrie Buck’s 
Daughter: A Popular, Quasi-Scientific Idea Can Be a Powerful Tool for Injustice, NAT. 
HISTORY, July/Aug. 2002, at 12. 
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This paved the way for other states to pass sterilization laws.’  Under these 
laws, an estimated 60,000 people were involuntarily sterilized.47  One-third 
of these persons, 20,000 people, were sterilized in California alone.48 
Although at first more men than women were sterilized, the numbers 
evened out as more and more girls and women were sterilized.49  The 
sterilization of women “was very much about controlling the sexuality of 
young single women and girls: those deemed to be wayward or 
promiscuous.”50  Additionally, a disproportionate number of people of 
color and foreign born individuals were sterilized.51  The same was true for 
individuals from broken homes, or whose parents were laborers.52 
3.  The Descent of Eugenics 
Eugenics began to experience a public relations setback during World 
War II.53  Initially the setback was due to a national physician shortage, 
then the Nuremberg trials in 1945 exposed the horror of Hitler’s eugenics.54  
However, the sterilization laws remained and sterilizations continued; but 
instead of protecting society, the sterilizations were then seen as 
therapeutic.55  California’s sterilization law was finally repealed in 1979.56  
Today, voluntary sterilization, with the individual’s full knowledge and 
consent, is legal in California.58 
The state of California has tried to make amends for its part in the 
eugenics history of America.59  Governor Davis issued a formal apology in 
2003.60  The California Senate Select Committee on Genetics, Genetic 
Technologies and Public Policy has created Senate Concurrent Resolution 
 
 46.  Stern, supra note 15, at 6-7. 
 47.  Id. at 7. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. at 8. 
 50.  Id. at 9.  Anton, supra note 31: “‘One of the giggling dangerous type — a 
delinquent sexually, morally.  Forged checks, remained away from home nights,’ reads the 
case file of a 16-year-old girl who was sent to the Sonoma State Home, sterilized and 
released.” 
 51.  Id. at 8; Anton, supra note 31. 
 52.  Anton, supra note 31. 
 53.  California’s Compulsory Sterilization Policies, supra note 17, at viii. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id.  “Up until the 1960s, the popular assumption was that patients’ [sic] accepted, 
and often approved of, their sterilization.” 
 56.  Stern, supra note 15, at 6-7. 
 57.   Id. at ix. 
 58.  Id.; CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1950-1969. 
 59.  Another state complicit in the sterilization nightmare, North Carolina, has 
proposed legislation to compensate its victims with $20,000 to each survivor who files a 
claim by 2009.  Editorial, North Carolina Could Make Amends for One of the Most 
Shameful Practices in Its History with a Bill that Would Compensate Sterilization Victims, 
NEWS & RECORD (Greensboro, NC), May 17, 2005, at A8. 
 60.  California Apologizes for Sterilization Law, supra note 13. 
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47.61 This resolution acknowledges California’s participation in the 
eugenics movement and resolves to express its regret in that participation, 
to honor all individuals, and to “urge every citizen of the state to become 
familiar with the history of the eugenics movement, in the hope that a more 
educated and tolerant populace will reject any similar abhorrent 
pseudoscientific movement should one arise in the future.”62  Yet, there are 
now in existence several forms of eugenics that are being tolerated by the 
state of California. 
II.  MODERN FORMS OF EUGENICS IN CALIFORNIA 
As “[t]he history of involuntary sterilization of institutionalized persons 
demonstrates . . . society has sometimes not hesitated to pursue what it 
perceived to be cost-saving measures at the expense of personal liberties.”63  
Now, however, instead of forced sterilization of those with undesirable 
traits, poor women in California are faced with new means of interference 
with their personal liberties.  These methods include: (1) limiting the 
number of children for whom a woman on welfare can get state support; (2) 
coercing drug-addicted women to surrender their reproductive capacities; 
and (3) forcing contraception use as a term of probation. 
A.  FAMILY CAPS IN CALIFORNIA AND THE CONTRAVENTION OF 
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 
1.  The History of Family Cap Programs64 
Unlike the flagrant violation of past undesirables’ right to reproductive 
autonomy, experienced by thousands of individuals under the California 
sterilization laws, current undesirables’ reproductive rights are being 
impinged covertly by the welfare system.  In particular, the family cap (or 
child exclusion) policy forces poor women to choose between the well-
being of her existing family and having more children.65  The history of 
family cap programs is short.  Each state makes the decision of whether 
and how to implement a program.  Family cap programs, in general, 
prohibit families on welfare from receiving an increase in their benefits if 
 
 61.  Filed with Secretary of State September 12, 2003. 
 62.  Senate Concurrent Resolution 47. 
 63.  PHILLIP REILLY, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY OF INVOLUNTARY 
STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 165 (1991). 
 64.  For an in-depth discussion of the history of family caps, see Kelly J. Gastley, 
Note, Why Family Cap Laws Just Aren’t Getting It Done, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373 
(2004). 
 65.  See Christina E. Norland Audigier, Comment, Starving Five to Prevent the Birth 
of One?: An International Human Rights Analysis of Child Exclusion Provisions and the 
Failure of Federal and State Constitutional Challenges, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 781 (2004) 
(arguing family caps are punitive measures, and that while they have been continually 
upheld by federal and state judiciaries, they cannot survive an international human rights 
analysis). 
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they have another child while on welfare.66  In California, a woman who 
would have received an incremental increase of $3.50 per day upon the 
birth of a new child prior to the implementation of the family cap program, 
now must stretch her existing welfare payments to cover the cost of the 
new child.67 
In 1996, the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (“TANF”) 
block program, which gives states the power to set up their own welfare 
plans, eligibility requirements, and program elements, replaced Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (“AFDC”).68  Prior to TANF, beginning 
in 1992, several states had implemented family cap programs under AFDC, 
which required a special waiver for a state to implement the program.69  
Now, under TANF, waivers are not required, making it easier for states to 
adopt such programs.  California and 23 other states currently have some 
type of family cap program.70  The programs are not uniform; there are 
variations from state to state.71  California, specifically, exempts children 
conceived as a result of rape, incest, or failure of certain birth control 
methods (IUD, Norplant, and sterilization.)72 
2.  The Rationale of Family Caps and Indications of Failure 
The objective of the California maximum family grant (“MFG”) statute 
(family cap program) is “to promote personal responsibility of welfare 
recipients by discouraging growth in family size while they received public 
assistance and by encouraging them, through work incentives, to support 
their families and thereby eliminate their dependence on welfare.”73 
 
 66.  Williams v. Martin, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (N.D. Ga. 2003).  More specifically, 
there are two types of family caps. The first and more popular type is where there is no 
increase in benefits upon the birth of a new child. In the second type, an increase is given 
but is reduced for each child born.  Additionally, the caps are implemented in three different 
ways: (1) benefits are fixed; (2) the state issues vouchers instead of cash; or (3) the state 
provides all families with the same flat grant regardless of the size of the family. Family 
Caps: Do They Promote Personal Responsibility? After Nine Years, the Jury is Still Out, 
http://www.ku.edu/~rlevy/public_Benefit_Law/reform_papers/familycaps.pdf (last visited 
May 22, 2005). 
 67.  Center for Law and Social Policy, Caps on Kids: Family Cap in the New Welfare 
Era, http://www.clasp.org/publications/caps_on_kids.pdf (last visited April 11, 2006). 
 68.  42 U.S.C. §§ 601-608 (2004); Marion Banzhaf, Welfare Reform and 
Reproductive Rights: Talking about Connections, http://www.fwhc.org/tanf.htm (last visited 
April 11, 2006). 
 69.  Legal Momentum, Background On Child Exclusion Proposals (Apr. 2000), 
http://www.legalmomentum.org/issues/wel/childep.shtml (last visited April 11, 2006). 
 70.   Center for Law and Social Policy, Lifting the Lid Off the Family Cap: States 
Revisit Problematic Policy for Welfare Mothers, http://www.clasp.org/DMS/Documents/ 
1071852641.91/family_cap_brf.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2004). 
 71.   Susan L. Thomas, “Ending Welfare As We Know It,” or Farewell to the Rights of 
Women on Welfare? A Constitutional and Human Rights Analysis of the Personal 
Responsibility Act, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 179, 195 (2001). 
 72.   CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE § 11450.04(b) (1)-(3) (2004). 
 73.   Sneed v. Saenz, 120 Cal. App. 4th 1220, 1230 (2004).  A secondary objective 
may be to send the message “that government is not in the business of ‘rewarding’ 
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However, the methods of achieving this and other similar goals are of 
dubious merit.74  These programs attempt to further these goals via 
behavior modification and the promotion of heterosexual marriages75 
through the elimination of benefits for “capped” children.76  Morality 
guides the legislation, which arguably coerces women into normal 
families.77 These underlying issues are, perhaps, indicated best by the 
California Legislature (in reference to CalWORKS):  “The Legislature 
finds and declares that the family unit is of fundamental importance to 
society in nurturing its members, passing on values, averting potential 
social problems, and providing the secure structure in which citizens live 
out their lives.”78  Further, “[c]ontemporary welfare reform in the United 
States is . . . framed by a moral panic about promiscuity among poor 
women in general — and among poor women of color in particular.”79 
The dichotomy of the undeserving vs. deserving poor informs public 
assistance programs of who should and should not receive benefits.80  
Professor Judith Koons traces the undeserving/deserving trope to the 
beginning of American welfare in colonial America.81  There was a dual 
system in place in which the deserving, elderly, widows, children, and the 
sick, were given more relief and held in higher esteem than those seen as 
undeserving, the able-bodied poor.82  The undeserving category included 
“women who did not ‘abide by societal norms — and were abandoned or 
never married’.”83  Today, this latter group is seen as the poster child of the 
undeserving — the “Welfare Queen.” 
In essence, these policies were and are based on stereotypes and 
myths.84  In opposition to the stereotypical image of the “Welfare Queen” 
who has children to get more money, empirical studies to date have not 
shown any correlation between receipt of benefits and the procreative 
 
childbearing among welfare recipients.”  Sometimes, the message may even be as important 
as the policy itself. Jane Gilbert Mauldon, Providing Subsidies and Incentives for Norplant, 
Sterilization and Other Contraception: Allowing Economic Theory to Inform Ethical 
Analysis, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 351, 355 (2003). 
 74.  Center for Law and Social Policy, supra note 69. 
 75.  Personal Responsibility Work and Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 
104-93, 101 Stat. 2110 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(3)(1996)): The 
Congressional findings begin with “Marriage is the foundation of a successful society.” 
 76.  Thomas, supra note 71, at 187. 
 77.  Risa E. Kaufman, State ERAs in the New Era: Securing Poor Women’s Equality 
By Eliminating Reproductive Based Discrimination, 24 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 191 (2001). 
 78.  CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE § 11207 (2004). 
 79.  Anna Marie Smith, The Sexual Regulation Dimension of Contemporary Welfare 
Law: A Fifty State Overview, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 121, 124 (2002). 
 80.  Carole M. Hirsch, Note, When the War on Poverty Became the War on Poor, 
Pregnant Women, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 335, 339-40 (2002). 
 81.  Judith E. Koons, Motherhood, Marriage, and Morality: The Pro-Marriage Moral 
Discourse of American Welfare Policy, 19 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 29 (2004). 
 82.  Id. at 30. 
 83.   Id. 
 84.  Hirsch, supra note 79; Kaufman, Thomas, supra note 71, at 194. 
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decisions of unmarried women.85  Also, the size of the welfare family is 
steadily decreasing in both family cap and non-family cap states.86  Thus, 
the rationale for the programs is questionable. 
Moreover, studies of the effects of the family cap programs themselves 
have been negative or inconclusive.87  A 1998 study by Rutgers University 
showed a small decrease in births after implementation of the New Jersey 
family cap program, but it also showed an increase in abortions among 
poor women.88  This fact has caused an unusual alliance between women’s 
rights and anti-abortion groups, all of whom do not want to force women 
into having abortions rather than have children they cannot afford under the 
family cap policy.89  This alliance became apparent in the bipartisan effort 
in New Jersey to ban the family cap policy in that state.90  That effort, 
however, like most of the legal challenges thus far, failed. 
3. Recent Legal Challenges to the Family Cap Program91 
Litigation in the context of family cap policies is heavily informed, if 
not doomed to failure, by the Supreme Court decision in Dandridge v. 
Williams.92  In Dandridge, Maryland welfare recipients challenged the 
Maryland maximum grant regulation (family cap policy) as a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause and the Social Security Act of 1935.93  In 
short, the appellees claimed that the regulation illegally ‘capped’ the size of 
a family at six members and, in effect, “denies benefits to the younger 
children in a large family.”94  The Court held that the regulation complied 
with both  the Social Security Act because it did provide some assistance to 
all qualified families; and the Equal Protection Clause, reviewed under a 
reasonable basis standard, because the cap was justified by Maryland’s 
 
 85.  Thomas, supra note 71, at 197. 
 86.  Smith, supra note 79, at 170. 
 87.  Center for Law and Social Policy, supra note 67. 
 88.  Id.; Kaufman, supra note 77, at 206. 
 89.  Hirsch, supra note 80, at 339-40. 
 90.  H.R. 4066 (1998), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/ z?c107:h.r. 
4066: (last visited May 23, 2005); Payne Takes Lead in Bill to Eliminate Family Cap, 
http://www.house.gov/payne/press/pr980617.html (last visited April 11, 2006). 
 91.  Additional, unsuccessful challenges have been brought in other jurisdictions on 
the following grounds: 1) a family cap itself is unconstitutional, under the New Jersey state 
constitution (Soujourner A. v. N.J. Dep’t of Human Servs, 177 N.J. 318 (N.J. 2003)); 2) the 
requirement of assignment of child support payments for a ‘capped’ child constitutes a 
taking, in violation of the fourteenth amendment (Williams v. Martin, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1286 
(N.D. Ga. 2003) and Williams v. Humphreys, 125 F. Supp. 2d 881 (Ind. 2001)); 3) a family 
cap infringes the right of family association (N.B. v. Sybinski, 724 N.E. 2d 1103 (Neb. 
2000).  For an informative discussion of family cap challenges across America, the 
problems with constitutional challenges to family caps, and an alternative legislative focus 
to combat family caps, see Kelly J. Gastley, Note, Why Family Cap Laws Just Aren’t 
Getting It Done, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373 (2004). 
 92.   397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
 93.  Id. at 473. 
 94.  Id. at 476. 
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rationales of moving individuals from welfare to the workforce, equalizing 
the welfare recipient and the worker, and encouraging family planning.95  
This decision “lends support to the view that States can impose limits on 
family size without fear that their decisions will be subjected to rigorous 
scrutiny by the courts.”96  Thus, a woman on welfare’s decision to bear a 
child is preempted by the state’s decision not to provide support. 
The litigation regarding family caps continues. California recently 
issued a decision on the breadth of its family cap program.97  In Sneed v. 
Saenz, a California appellate court ruled that the California family cap plan 
applies to all welfare recipients, and not just to “hard-core” ones.98 The 
plaintiffs in this case were welfare recipients who also had additional non-
welfare income.99  They challenged the application of the family cap 
program to their families.100  The court held that the cap applied to all 
families, including those with earned income, and this was consistent with 
the Legislature’s legitimate “goals of gradually reducing the cash grant, 
while allowing a family’s income to increase without being discounted, as 
the family works toward becoming self-sufficient.”101  The court also found 
that “the MFG statute has no coercive effect so as to make it 
unconstitutional.”102  The court dismissed the notion that the statute 
interferes with fundamental privacy rights, and stated that no suspect class 
is involved  so as to require heightened scrutiny under equal protection.103 
Under a rational basis standard of review the court held the legislature’s 
purpose was legitimate.104 
In contrast to the California case, in Mason v. State of Neb., the 
Nebraska Supreme Court found there were exceptions to their family cap 
program.105  The plaintiffs were disabled single mothers who did not have 
the capacity to work.106  The court rejected the State’s argument that 
interpreting the statute in question as not applicable to the plaintiffs would 
raise an equal protection problem because there is a rational basis for 
treating the plaintiffs differently from others who are subject to the family 
cap.107  The court affirmed the finding that the family cap program did not 
 
 95.  Id. at 487. Kirstin Andreasen, Part One: Family, the Constitution, and 
Federalism: Dandridge v. Williams: The Supreme Court and Acceptable Family Size, 14 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 41, 42, 44 (2004). 
 96.  Andreasen, supra note 95, at 46. 
 97.  120 Cal. App. 4th 1220 (2004). 
 98.  Sneed, 120 Cal. App. 4th 1220. 
 99.  Id. at 1228. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 1244. 
 102.  Id. at 1249. 
 103.  Id. at 1250. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Mason, 267 Neb. at 44. 
 106.  Mason, 267 Neb. at 46. 
 107.  Id. at 54. 
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apply to families in which there was no adult with the capacity to work 
because “[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intent to apply the family 
cap to such families, we must construe the Act in the manner which best 
achieves its beneficent purposes.”108 
A comparison of these two cases dealing with exceptions to family cap 
programs highlights the underlying theme of deserving vs. undeserving 
poor.  In Mason, the plaintiffs were disabled and unable to work; they are 
the deserving poor.  In Sneed, the plaintiffs were welfare recipients who 
were capable of working; they are the undeserving poor.  It is not 
surprising that the courts had opposite holdings. 
4.  Family Cap Programs as a Mechanism of Social Control 
The family cap program seeks to enforce morality through coercive and 
punitive methods, while possibly impinging on women’s reproductive 
rights.  The reasoning behind the programs is to decrease irresponsible 
procreation, especially out-of-wedlock births, and to reduce government 
funding.109  The methodology of the program is seemingly ineffective, 
based on stereotypical images of undeserving poor and myths of welfare 
mothers who have children to get more money.  Yet, the recent legal 
challenge does not seem to reach this stage of analysis.  California courts 
have found that family caps are rationally related to the government’s 
legitimate purposes and the interest in being paid support is not 
fundamental.  California could, hypothetically, act more directly to 
contravene a woman’s reproductive control and condition the receipt of 
welfare payments on use of birth control.110  Perhaps this is the future of 
welfare, or perhaps it is unconstitutional for the state to interfere so overtly 
with a woman’s fundamental rights, but a growing and controversial 
private organization does just that without legal intervention. 
 
 108.  Mason, 267 Neb. at 55. 
 109.  Kaufman, supra note 77, at 204-5. 
 110.  See Kimberly A. Smith, Conceivable Sterilization: A Constitutional Analysis of 
a Norplant/Depo-Provera Welfare Condition, 77 IND. L.J. 389 (2002). Smith’s analysis 
finds that conditioning welfare on use of Norplant and Depo-Provera may be constitutional.  
This conclusion may be based more in fact than in speculation since, as discussed above, 
California, for example, has an exception to its family cap for those whose birth control 
failed.  The result is that those who use permanent or semi-permanent means of birth control 
will get an increase in their benefits if they have additional children on welfare.  Thus, use 
(and failure) of birth control equals more welfare relief. Further, in 1990, shortly after 
Norplant became available, policymakers suggested it be used to decrease the number of 
children born to welfare mothers.  All proposals made, however, faced heavy opposition, 
and none successfully became law.  Mauldon, supra note 73, at 354. 
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B.  PROJECT PREVENTION/CHILDREN REQUIRING A CARING KOMMUNITY 
(C.R.A.C.K.) 
1.  Project Prevention — How It Works 
Project Prevention, a privately-run organization, calls itself “a common 
sense approach to a very serious problem,” but its logic is strikingly similar 
to that of the progressive eugenicists of an earlier time.111  In 1996, foster 
mom Barbara Harris, who saw firsthand the devastating effects of pregnant 
women’s illegal drug use on their offspring, unsuccessfully sought to get 
the Prenatal Neglect Act passed, which would have created the crime of 
prenatal child neglect.112  Then in 1997, Harris founded an organization 
called Children Requiring A Caring Kommunity, or C.R.A.C.K., now 
renamed Project Prevention, in Pasadena, California.113  The purpose of the 
organization is to “save our welfare system” and reduce the number of drug 
addicted births.114  The methodology of the program is, however, very 
controversial. Project Prevention attempts to achieve its worthy goals115 by 
offering drug-addicted women $200 to get permanent or long-term birth 
control.116  According to their website, Project Prevention has helped 1558 
drug addicts by giving them the proffered payment upon proof of use of 
Depo-Provera, Essure, IUD, Norplant, tubal ligation or vasectomy.117  In 
essence, Project Prevention buys women’s reproductive capacities.  There 
 
 111.  Project Prevention at http://www.projectprevention.org (last visited April 11, 
2006). 
 112.  Lynn M. Paltrow, Why Caring Communities Must Oppose C.R.A.C.K./Project 
Prevention: How C.R.A.C.K. Promotes Dangerous Propaganda and Undermines the Health 
and Well Being of Children and Families, 5 J.L. SOC’Y 11, 17 (2003). 
 113.   Vida Foubister, Crackdown on drug-addicted pregnancies draws concern, 
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2000/11/20/prsa1120.htm (last visited 
April 11, 2006). 
 114.  Theyn Kigvamasud’Vashti, Communities Against Rape and Abuse, Fact Sheet 
on Positive Prevention/CRACK (Children Requiring A Caring Kommunity), at 
http://www.cwpe.org/sex%20lies%20contraception%20pack/fact%20sheet%20crack.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 9, 2005). 
 115.  The problem of substance exposed infants gained headlines in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s.  Estimates are that between eleven and fifteen percent of children born in 
the United States have been exposed in utero to illegal drugs. Jennifer Mott Johnson, Note, 
Reproductive Ability for Sale, Do I Hear $ 200?: Private Cash for Contraception 
Agreements As an Alternative to Maternal Substance Abuse, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 205 at 205, 
207 (2001).  
 116.  Men also have gone through the program, but their numbers are small. For 
example, as of June 2005, only 27 of the 1558 participants were men.  Project Prevention at 
http://www.projectprevention.org/programs/faqs.html (last visited June 27, 2005). 
 117.  Project Prevention at http://www.projectprevention.org/program/index.html 
(last visited June 27, 2005); Project Prevention at http://www.projectprevention.org/ 
program/faqs.html (last visited June 27, 2005).  In August of 2002, the manufacturer of 
Norplant suspended sales after settling the claims of thousands of women who said they had 
not been adequately warned about Norplant’’ side effects. Andrew Harris, Ruling Finishes 
off Norplant Suits, NAT’L  L.J., Sept. 30, 2002 at B6. Other forms of implantable 
contraceptives still exist. 
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are several ethical and legal issues that arise from the program’s scheme. 
2.  Project Prevention — Eugenics as a Means of Population Control 
“Don’t let a Pregnancy Ruin Your Drug Habit” read billboards and 
flyers placed in poor neighborhoods in urban areas by Project Prevention 
workers and volunteers.118  Instead of the “feeble minded” or others with 
undesirable traits being targeted for negative eugenic measures, now it is 
“poor, drug addicted, and often homeless women [who] are being coerced 
into forever forgoing this fundamental right [of procreation].”119  The 
difference between the forced or coerced sterilization under the 
Asexualization Act and the coerced sterilization of drug addicts through 
contract with Project Prevention, is that instead of targeting individuals 
who are perceived as genetically inferior, Project Prevention is targeting 
those who are socially inferior, and whose children, like those of their 
eugenic antecedents, will be a burden on the welfare system.120 
Supporters of Project Prevention argue unpersuasively that the program 
is not eugenical in nature.  One argument is that recipients of both the 
permanent and the long-term methods of birth control receive the same 
$200, thus it is far removed from the sterilization horrors of the eugenics 
age.121  However, when Project Prevention first began it had a sliding 
scale.122  Participants who opted for sterilization received more money than 
their counterparts who had Norplant implanted or had a series of Depo-
Provera shots.123  A second argument is that $200 is not enough of an 
incentive for an individual to sell her fertility.124  But even a scholar who 
finds the program “efficient” and “ethical” acknowledges that “[f]or an 
addict seeking an instant high, any incentive payment, no matter how small 
might be a motivator.”125  A third argument is that no individual would 
choose to get sterilized if he or she truly did not want to and was not 
physically forced.126  Each individual has her own reasons for participating 
in the program, but underlying all the decisions is the fact that these women 
are drug addicts in need of cash.  It is not paternalistic to acknowledge the 
 
 118.  Kigvamasud’Vashti, supra note 114; Adam B. Wolf, What money cannot buy: a 
legislative response to C.R.A.C.K., 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 173 at 178 (2000); Margaret 
Merritt-Planned Parenthood Affiliates of CA, In a presentation to the Senate Select 
Committee on Genetics, Genetic Technologies and Public Policy, July 16, 2003. 
 119.  Wolf, supra note 118, at 189. 
 120.  See Lisa Powell, Note, Eugenics and Equality: Does the Constitution Allow 
Policies Designed to Discourage Reproduction Among Disfavored Groups?, 20 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 481 at 499 (2002). 
 121.   Janet Ashley Murphy and Robert A. Pugsley, Successful Pregnancy Prevention 
Program for Addicts Remains Under Siege, 5 J.L. SOC’Y 155, 170 (2003). 
 122.   Renee Chelian, Remarks on the “Crack” Program: Coercing Women’s 
Reproductive Choices, 5 J.L. SOC’Y 187, 189 (2003). 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Murphy, supra note 121, at 170. 
 125.  Mauldon, supra note 73, at 360. 
 126.  Murphy, supra note 121, at 170. 
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vulnerability of Project Prevention’s clients.  Further, societal stereotypes 
and myths, promulgated by Project Prevention, may play a role in why 
some women have chosen to participate. 
3.  Project Prevention and Societal Myths 
Project Prevention, like the eugenicist movement and welfare reform, 
is based on myths and stereotypes.  The image of the typical client of 
Project Prevention is that of the crack cocaine addict, reminiscent of the 
“Welfare Queen”: lazy, drug-addicted prostitutes, who are irresponsible 
and do not love their children.127  Certainly this image pre-existed Project 
Prevention.  In the 1980s the “crack baby crisis” made regular headlines, as 
did the punitive measures taken against some of the mothers.128  Even now, 
when medical research shows that fetal cocaine exposure is not as harmful 
as previously thought, the image is still powerful.129  Project Prevention, or 
C.R.A.C.K. as it was first named, capitalized on these images to draw 
attention to itself.  Although the organization vehemently denies charges 
that it is racist,130 the choice of the name C.R.A.C.K. alone is questionable 
considering that crack cocaine is widely known as a drug that is more 
popular in African-American communities than in white communities.131  If 
the goal of the program is to “stop children winding up in foster care or 
with long-term health problems, whose care puts an enormous burden on 
the taxpayer,”132 then why target crack cocaine users in particular?  Further, 
most of the advertising has been in poor communities of color.133 
Racism aside, another myth is that drug addicts have large numbers of 
children.134  This is untrue. “[S]tudies have shown that low-income women 
with publicly identified drug problems have an average of two to three 
children each.”135  Yet, this image is reified by the organization itself. 
Harris has been quoted as saying “[t]hese women literally have litters of 
 
 127.   Paltrow, supra note 112, at 23-24. 
 128.  For an informative discussion of the criminalization of drug addiction and the 
history of the sterilization of Black women in America, see Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing 
Drug Addicts Who Have Babies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991). 
 129.  Murphy, supra note 121, at 172. 
 130.  “It is racist, or at least ignorant, for someone to learn about our program and 
assume that only black addicts will be calling us.  Not all drug addicts are black.” Project 
Prevention at http://www.projectprevention.org/program/faqs.html (last visited June 27, 
2005). 
 131.  Roberts, supra note 128, at 1419. 
 132.  Clare Murphy, Selling Sterilisation to Addicts, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Sept. 2, 
2003, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ 
americas/3189763.stm.  Further if the goal of Project Prevention is to give poor women 
“access” to birth control, why not use the money and efforts to promote sex education in the  
schools or inner city clinics? Project Prevention at http://www.projectprevention.org/ 
program/faqs.html (last visited June 27, 2005). 
 133.  Chelian, supra note 122, at 190. 
 134.  Andrew Gumbel, America’s New Family Values, INDEP. (London), Nov. 25, 
2003, at 4. 
 135.  Paltrow, supra note 112, at 38. 
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children!  They’re not acting any more responsible than a dog on heat.”136 
Finally, another myth is that these women have unintended pregnancies 
because they are unusually irresponsible.137  “C.R.A.C.K. portrays its 
clients as breeding machines, uniquely prone to unintended 
pregnancies.”138  However, more than half of all pregnancies in the United 
States are “mistakes.”139  Further, viewing a woman as a “dog on heat” (sic) 
shows the failure of Project Prevention “to see women who struggle with 
substance abuse as capable of the same sort of motivation for having 
children as all women.”140  Thus, Project Prevention appears to be a new 
means of controlling the population. The question remains — is it legal? 
4.  Project Prevention- Unstoppable by the Laws of Contract? 
 a.  Informed Consent and the Capacity to Contract 
One issue regarding the legality of Project Prevention is whether a 
valid informed consent can be given by its drug addicted clientele.  In 
addition to the addiction problem, many of these poverty-stricken women, 
to whom $200 is a powerful incentive, also experience “disproportionate 
rates of sexual and physical violence, HIV, mental illness, homelessness, 
instability, imprisonment and death row sentences, posttraumatic stress 
disorder, and repetitive micro- and macro-aggression and insults as a result 
of oppression.”141  Thus, Project Prevention is on notice that not only may 
the woman be impaired since drug addiction is a requirement of the 
program, but she is likely dealing with other issues that will affect her 
ability to make rational decisions.142 
There is an argument that the women who contract with C.R.A.C.K. 
are not capable of making a valid contract with the organization.143  If a 
woman was under the influence of drugs at the time of the formation of the 
contract, it is questionable whether she had the capacity to make it.144 
However, it would be unlikely that at the time she was actually sterilized 
she would be under the influence of drugs, since the medical facility should 
have tested her to make sure there were no substances in her body that 
 
 136.   Gumbel, supra note 134. 
 137.  Paltrow, supra note 112, at 40-41. 
 138.  Id. at 40. 
 139.  Id. at 41. 
 140.   Chelian, supra note 122, at 191. 
 141.  Kigvamasud’Vashti, supra note 114. 
 142.  Johnson, supra note 115, at 230. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Johnson, supra note 115, at 230.  It would probably be unlikely that the 
individual’s drug addiction would make a court find the person incompetent.  “Illustrations 
of incompetence severe enough to make a party’s contractual obligations voidable include 
brain damage caused by accident or organic disease, mental illness with symptoms such as 
delusions and hallucinations, and congenital intelligence deficiencies.  One could question 
whether the law should consider addiction an ‘incapacity’ at all.” 
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would interfere with the surgery.145  Thus, incapacity is unlikely to be a 
successful attack to void the contract. 
 b.  Unconscionable and Against Public Policy 
Alternatively, a court might find the contract to be unconscionable. 
“C.R.A.C.K.’s clients are coerced into relinquishing their reproductive 
rights; it is an arrangement between two parties with grossly unequal 
bargaining power.”146  One’s reproductive capacity in exchange for $200 
seems to fit the definition of unconscionable.147 
The strongest argument to invalidate a contract between Project 
Prevention and a client is that the contract is unconscionable and is against 
public policy.  By drawing an analogy between surrogacy agreements and 
agreements such as Project Prevention’s pay for sterilization, there is a 
cogent line of reasoning that the latter would also be found invalid if 
challenged.148  Surrogacy and adoption agreements that involve the 
exchange of money for the custody of a child are held against public policy 
for several reasons under state law, such as: the prohibition of money for 
child exchange; termination of parental rights requires proof of that 
parent’s unfitness; revocable surrender of custody; and the idea that 
children should be raised by their natural parents.149  Another reason to 
hold against surrogacy agreements, albeit a paternalistic one, is that these 
agreements particularly attract poor women who “need to be protected 
from exploitation.”150  It is this latter reason that most aptly mirrors the 
circumstance of the Project Prevention client: severely uneven bargaining 
positions. 
Another analogy can be drawn between the selling of body parts or 
organs and Project Prevention’s buying of reproductive capacity.151  The 
National Organ Transplant Act prohibits the receipt of money for an 
organ.152  The idea behind the Act was to prevent the commodification of 
human organs.153  “Simply put, it is wrong to buy or sell irreplaceable body 
parts.”154  Similarly, it can be said that it is wrong to buy or sell one’s 
reproductive capacity, the potential to have children, because it is a 
fundamental right.  One argument against this analogy is that the Project 
Prevention client has the choice whether to have permanent or long-term 
 
 145.   Johnson, supra note 115, at 230. 
 146.  Wolf, supra note 118, at 181-83. 
 147.  An unconscionable agreement is defined as “an agreement that no promisor 
with any sense, and not under a delusion, would make, and that no honest and fair promisee 
would accept.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 28 (2nd Pocket ed. 2001). 
 148.  Wolf, supra note 118, at 180. 
 149.  Johnson, supra note 115, at 232-33. 
 150.  Id. at 233. 
 151.  Wolf, supra note 118, at 181-83. 
 152.  Id. at 181; National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1994). 
 153.  Wolf, supra note 118, at 181-83. 
 154.  Id. at 183. 
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birth control as opposed to permanent organ removal.155  However, that 
argument would mean that it is acceptable to “lease” one’s fertility, but not 
to “sell” it. 
 c.  Contract Defenses Fall Short 
Contract defenses, even if successful, fall short in very practical ways.  
First, Project Prevention itself would never seek court enforcement of its 
contract with a client because the contract is not formed until after the 
client has had the medical procedure for sterilization or long-term birth 
control.156  Second, it will be useless for a woman to have the contract 
invalidated after she has performed her part of the contract and gone 
through with the surgery.  A sterilization procedure is permanent, even if a 
court later decides that the contract was invalid because of lack of informed 
consent, lack of capacity, unconscionability or invalidity as against public 
policy.157  Since contract law does not offer any solution to the Project 
Prevention problem, a  private actor may be legally able to coerce a woman 
into surrendering her fertility.  But this leaves open the issue of whether a 
state could similarly make an unconscionable deal with a woman in 
compromising circumstances. 
C.  CONTRACEPTION AS A TERM OF PROBATION 
A third type of modern eugenics is contraception as a term of 
probation.  Like family caps and Project Prevention, it acts punitively to 
prevent the undeserving from reproducing.  In 1991, in a California 
Superior Court, Darlene Johnson pled guilty to child abuse and was given 
an unusual term of probation.158  Johnson, an unwed mother of four and 
pregnant with her fifth child, became the first woman ordered by a court to 
be implanted with Norplant.159  This form of “creative sentencing,”160 while 
 
 155.  Jane Gilbert Mauldon, Providing Subsidies and Incentives for Norplant, 
sterilization and other contraception: allowing economic theory to inform ethical analysis, 
September 22, 2003, Gale Group, Inc., American Society of Law & Medicine, Inc., 
JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS. 
 156.  Johnson, supra note 115, at 232-3. 
 157.  Id. at 231. 
 158.   NARAL Foundation, Reproductive Freedom & Choice, Unjust Punishment, 
Forced Contraception, and Poor Treatment of Women by the Courts and Prisons, 
http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/facts/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm+P
ageID=1784 (last visited Feb. 15, 2005). 
 159.  Id.  Norplant is a long-term contraceptive that is implanted under the skin of a 
woman’s arm.  It is made up of six tubes the size of matchsticks that contain synthetic 
hormones.  It is very effective, lasts for about five years, and then must be removed 
surgically by a physician.  Additionally, like most drugs, Norplant has side effects and is not 
appropriate for women with certain heath conditions.  Janet F. Ginzberg, Compulsory 
Contraception as a Condition of Probation: The Use and Abuse of Norplant, 58 BROOK. L. 
REV. 979, 980 (1992). 
 160.   Johnson’s probation condition was never fulfilled because it was rendered moot 
when, for a violation of another condition of her probation, Johnson was sentenced to 
prison. Ginzberg, supra note 159, at 979 n.1. 
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a first of its kind, is not totally unprecedented.  In fact, since the 1960s 
there have been at least 20 cases where judges have ordered convicted 
persons not to procreate or to use some form of contraception, or even to be 
sterilized.161  Compulsory contraception is arguably unconstitutional as an 
interference with constitutionally fundamental privacy rights,162 and is 
being used to further eugenic goals.163 
1.  Sterilization as Punishment 
Not long after the Supreme Court upheld Virginia’s sterilization law in 
Buck v. Bell,164 it called procreation “a basic liberty” and “one of the basic 
civil rights of man.”165  In Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, the 
Supreme Court invalidated, on equal protection grounds, Oklahoma’s 
Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act,166  which provided for the sterilization 
of persons convicted of two or more crimes “amounting to felonies 
involving moral turpitude.”167 The statute distinguished between 
individuals convicted of embezzlement and those, like Mr. Skinner, who 
had been convicted of larceny.168  However, Skinner did not overturn Buck. 
The Court instead distinguished Buck in part because “the defendant [was] 
given no opportunity to be heard on the issue as to whether he is the 
probable potential parent of socially undesirable offspring” and the state 
did not attempt to prove that larcenous individuals have “biologically 
inheritable traits which he who commits embezzlement lacks.”169  Thus, the 
Court stuck by its earlier pro-eugenics stance, but decided that there was no 
compelling reason why only one group of criminals should be so punished 
and not the other.170  Nevertheless, Skinner has come to be remembered as 
the first case to establish that procreation is a fundamental right.171 
 
 161.   NARAL Foundation, supra note 157.  An early “no pregnancy” case was that of 
People v. Dominguez, 256 Cal. App. 2d 623 (1967).  In Dominguez, the defendant was a 
young unmarried mother of two pregnant with her third child.  Id. at 625.  She was charged 
with second degree robbery for driving the get-away car.  Id. at 624-25.  She was placed on 
probation.  Id. at 625.  One of the conditions of her probation was: “The third condition is 
that you are not to live with any man to whom you are not married and you are not to 
become pregnant until after you become married. . . . You have already too many of those 
. . . Do you know where the Planned Parenthood Clinic is?”  Id.  On appeal, the condition 
was found void because it was not directly related to the crime of robbery.  Id. at 628. 
 162.  A discussion of the constitutional right to privacy and how those concepts 
interact with modern forms of eugenics follows this section. 
 163.   See Ginzberg, supra note 159, at 984. 
 164.  274 U.S. 200. 
 165.  Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 166.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 171 (1935), invalidated by Skinner v. Oklahoma ex 
rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
 167.  Skinner, 316 U.S. 535 at 536, 538. 
 168.  Id. at 538-39. 
 169.  Id. at 538, 541. 
 170.   Id. at 542. 
 171.   Silver, supra note 16, at 869. 
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 2.  Governmental Coercion 
If procreation is a fundamental right, then one would think that the 
state must have a compelling objective in order to require contraception as 
a term of probation.  Actually, courts get to sidestep this issue because the 
individual can choose between the proffered terms of probation or to go to 
prison.  It is his or her choice.  This distinction is well illustrated in a recent 
case involving a deadbeat dad. 
David Oakley pled no contest to three counts of intentional refusal to 
pay child support.172  Oakley was sentenced to probation, but the judge 
imposed a special condition: “while on probation, Oakley cannot have any 
more children unless he demonstrates that he had [sic] the ability to support 
them and that he is supporting the children he already had.”173  Oakley’s 
history, which warranted such creative sentencing, showed that he was the 
father of nine children by four different women and that he was a repeat 
offender.174  The Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld the lower court 
because it reasoned: (1) “probation conditions — like prison regulations — 
are not subject to strict scrutiny analysis;” (2) “incarceration, by its very 
nature, deprives a convicted individual of the fundamental right to be free 
from physical restraint, which in turn encompasses and restricts other 
fundamental rights, such as the right to procreate;” and (3) Oakley still has 
a choice — he can procreate if he can support all of his children.175  While 
this case is decidedly different from California’s Johnson case because here 
the defendant is not physically implanted with a contraceptive device, 
Oakley parallels the infringement on the right to procreate as punishment. 
The dissent in Oakley astutely points out that the choice presented to 
Oakley is illusory.  The trial court imposed the condition on Oakley fully 
aware that he would never be able to support all of his children.176  Thus, 
for the probation term, Oakley will be in violation if he fathers another 
child.  In other words, “the birth of a child [will] carry criminal 
sanctions.”177  Also, the court proscribed only the fathering of another 
child, not engagement in sexual intercourse.178  This means that if Oakley 
impregnates a woman during the probationary period, she will be forced to 
 
 172.  State of Wisconsin v. Oakley, 2001 WI 103, ¶ 4, 245 Wis. 2d 447, 453, 629 
N.W.2d 200, 202. 
 173.  Id. at ¶ 6, 245 Wis. 2d at 454, 629 N.W.2d at 203. 
 174.  Id. at ¶ 3, 245 Wis. 2d at 452, 629 N.W.2d at 202. 
 175.  Id. at ¶ 16 n.23, ¶ 19, ¶ 20, 245 Wis. 2d at 465 n.23, 468, 473, 629 N.W.2d at 
208 n.23, 209, 212. 
 176.  Id. at ¶ 49, 245 Wis. 2d at 485, 629 N.W.2d at 217 (Bradley, A.W. dissenting) 
quoting the trial judge: “You know and I know you’re probably never going to make 75 or 
100 thousand dollar [sic] a year.  You’re going to struggle to make 25 or 30.  And by the 
time you take care of your taxes and your social security, there isn’t a whole lot to go 
around, and then you’ve got to ship it out to various children.” 
 177.  Id. at ¶ 41, 245 Wis. 2d at 482, 629 N.W.2d at 216. 
 178.  Id. at ¶ 47, 245 Wis. 2d at 483, 629 N.W.2d at 217. 
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decide between having an abortion or sending Oakley to prison.179  So 
either the government is coercing abortion or is creating a situation in 
which Oakley’s children will continue to suffer because their father is 
imprisoned and unable to work to support them.180 
Returning to the State of California, Johnson, like Oakley, was to 
surrender her right to procreate, but further was also to forgo her right to 
refuse a medical procedure.181  Yet, California has made some headway 
into finding restrictions on procreation as terms of probation violative of 
state and federal constitutions.  In People v. Zaring, a California Court of 
Appeal found that a judge’s182 condition that the defendant not get pregnant 
during the probationary period was invalid because it was impermissibly 
overbroad.183  In Zaring, the defendant had been convicted of heroin 
charges, and not child abuse like in Johnson.184  The court did not, 
however, decide whether it would ever uphold a no pregnancy term if the 
underlying crime related to the well-being of a child born or unborn.185 
The court in Zaring, however, noted that the rationale of the sentence 
was more morality driven than rehabilitative in purpose.186  The judge 
made this distinction fairly obvious when he told the defendant: “I want 
make [sic] to make it clear that one of the reasons I am making this order is 
you’ve got five children. You’re thirty years old. None of your children are 
in your custody or control.  Two of them [are] on [welfare].  And I’m afraid 
that if you get pregnant we’re going to get a cocaine or heroin addicted 
baby.”187  While the court addresses this issue, it does not expressly say 
that moral judgments of how many children one has and at what age is not 
the business of the law. Instead it says: “In our view, the morality of having 
children while on public assistance, and the imposing of any 
constitutionally permissible legal deterrences to such a practice, are matters 
 
 179.  Id. at ¶ 57, 245 Wis. 2d at 489, 629 N.W.2d at 219. 
 180.  Id. at ¶ 60, 245 Wis. 2d at 490, 629 N.W.2d at 220. 
 181.   In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), the 
Supreme Court acknowledged that there is a significant liberty interest in refusing medical 
treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. 
 182.   The judge was, in fact, the same judge as in the Darlene Johnson case.  Judge 
Howard R. Broadman was later publicly censored for “conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.”  The Supreme Court 
of California, in upholding Broadman’s censure, reviewed both the Johnson case and the 
Zaring case.  Broadman v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 18 Cal. 4th 1079, 1087 
(1998). 
 183.  8 Cal. App. 4th 362, 372 (1992). 
 184.  Id. at 365. 
 185.  Id. at 372; In a recent out-of-state case, a Georgia mother of seven pled guilty to 
voluntary manslaughter of her 5- week-old daughter rather than face a life sentence if 
convicted of murder.  A condition of her sentence is that she undergo a tubal ligation.  Errin 
Haines, Ga. Mom Admits Killing, to be Sterilized, Feb. 9, 2005, BOSTON.COM, 
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2005/02/09/ga_mom_admits_killing_to_be_ste
rilized/. 
 186.  Zaring, 8 Cal. App. 4th at 373. 
 187.  Id. at 368. 
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properly left to the wisdom and judgment of the legislature elected by the 
people, and not to the morality of individual judges.”188  In other words, if 
the legislature wants to restrict the procreation of a woman receiving 
assistance, as in the instance of family caps, it can. And it can do so 
because of morality.  The court’s statement in Zaring regarding preference 
for letting the legislature make the moral decisions, is telling of the true 
rationale for procreative restrictions: preventing the unfit from becoming 
parents.189 
IV.  THE RIGHT TO PERSONAL AUTONOMY AS 
ENCOMPASSED IN THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
The modern forms of eugenics impinge on the right to procreate.  Since 
Skinner, other Supreme Court cases have cemented and clarified the right 
to procreate as a fundamental right encompassed in the right to privacy. 
Griswold v. Connecticut, an early reproductive rights case, established the 
right of married people to use contraceptives.190  The Court found the 
fundamental right to privacy in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights.191 
Douglas, writing for the majority, said that the guarantees in the Bill of 
Rights create “zones of privacy.”192 
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the right established in Griswold to use 
contraceptives, was extended to unmarried individuals on equal protection 
grounds.193  In Eisenstadt, the Court made it clear that the right of privacy 
belongs to the individual.  “If a right of privacy means anything, it is the 
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as 
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”194 
Next in Loving v. Virginia, from which the strict scrutiny standard was 
born, an interracial married couple challenged Virginia’s miscegenation 
statute and won.195  The Court, while discussing equal protection in great 
depth, founded its decision on privacy grounds and on the fundamental 
right to marriage.196  The Court proclaimed: “Marriage is one of the ‘basic 
civil rights of man’ fundamental to our very existence and survival. . . .  
The 14th Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be 
restricted by invidious racial discriminations.  Under our Constitution, the 
freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the 
 
 188.   Zaring, 8 Cal. App. 4th at 374. 
 189.  See California’s Compulsory Sterilization Polices 1909-1979: Hearing Before 
the S. Select Comm. on Genetics, Genetic Technologies and Public Policy, 2003 Leg. (Cal. 
2003) (statement of Valerie Small Navarro, ACLU). 
 190.  381 U.S. 479. 
 191.  Id. at 483. 
 192.  Id. at 484. 
 193.  405 U.S. 438. 
 194.  Id. at 453. 
 195.  388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 196.  Id. 
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individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”197 
In the controversial landmark case, Roe v. Wade, the Court founded its 
decision to protect a woman’s right to choose an abortion prior to viability 
in the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause.198 
 
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon 
state action, as we feel it is, or as the District Court determined, in 
the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad 
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy.  The detriment that the State would 
impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether 
is apparent.199 
 
A woman has a right, but not an absolute right, to terminate her 
pregnancy.200 
The abortion right declared in Roe, however, was limited in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.201  In Casey, the Court 
set forth a new standard of an undue burden or substantial obstacle test.202 
Thus, states can now discourage abortion, so long as its methods do not 
create a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion 
pre-viability. 
More recently, Lawrence v. Texas has reinforced the idea of a right to 
sexual privacy.203  In Lawrence, the Court invalidated a Texas sodomy law 
that made homosexual sex illegal.204  The Court decided in this case that 
the constitutionally protected right to privacy encompassed sexual activity 
regardless of whether it was heterosexual or homosexual in nature.205  The 
Court also stated that moral condemnation of homosexual activity does not 
have a place within our laws: 
 
It must be acknowledged, of course, that . . . for centuries there 
have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as 
 
 197.  Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
 198.  410 U.S. 113. 
 199.  Id. at 153. 
 200.  Id. at 154: “We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes 
the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against 
important state interests in regulation.”  The Court goes on to establish a trimester system in 
which the government is allowed to create restrictions on abortion after viability of the 
fetus. 
 201.  505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 202.  “[T]he undue burden standard is the appropriate means of reconciling the 
State’s interest with the woman’s constitutionally protected liberty.”  Id. at 876. 
 203.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 204.   Id. 
 205.  Id. 
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immoral.  The condemnation has been shaped by religious beliefs, 
conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the 
traditional family. . . .  These considerations do not answer the 
question before us, however.  The issue is whether the majority 
may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole 
society. . . .  Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to 
mandate our own moral code.206 
 
Lawrence overruled Bowers v. Hardwick,207 which held that laws 
making sodomy illegal were constitutional.208  In Bowers, the Court held 
that there is no constitutional right to homosexual sexual privacy.209  While 
Lawrence did not hold that there is a fundamental right to homosexual sex, 
it did hold that the Texas statute in question violated the privacy rights of 
homosexuals under a rational basis test.210 
Thus, the evolution of the Supreme Court’s recognition of a 
constitutionally protected right to privacy has resulted in an increasingly 
strong right to freedom in the realms of sexual and reproductive rights.  
The Court has also made the individual the central decision-maker 
regarding his or her own reproductive or sexual privacy and restricted the 
use of moral condemnation as a limitation of fundamental rights.  Yet, the 
modern forms of eugenics permitted by the California are products of 
moral condemnation.  They are being utilized as means of restricting and/or 
thwarting an individual’s expression of her fundamental right to procreate. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In sum, California has made many advances in acknowledging and 
moving away from its eugenic past, yet it still has a long way to go. 
California is at a crossroads.  While the State apologized for its past abuses 
to further eugenic goals, it now uses or allows semi-cloaked eugenic 
practices to continue.  Modern eugenics takes the form of family caps, 
exchanges of money for sterilization, and the looming threat of prohibition 
on procreation as a term of probation.  The target population has not really 
changed, the terminology has just been adjusted ever so slightly: it is no 
longer the biological defective who will produce undesirable offspring, but 
instead, the socially unfit parent who will raise undeserving offspring. 
 
 
 206.  Id. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 
(1992) (internal quotations omitted)). 
 207.   “Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today.  It 
ought not to remain binding precedent.  Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is 
overruled.”  Id. at 578 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 208.   478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. 
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